Volume 31

Issue 1

Article 7

December 1924

Part Performance and the Statute of Frauds
A. P.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
A. P., Part Performance and the Statute of Frauds, 31 W. Va. L. Rev. (1924).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol31/iss1/7

This Student Notes and Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The
Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized
editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

P.: Part Performance and the Statute of Frauds
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

PART PERFORMANCE AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-The fourth
section of the English Statute of Frauds is as follows: "No action
shall be brought to charge any person upon any agreement made
in consideration of marriage, or upon any contract for the sale
of land, tenements, hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning
them, or upon any agreement that is to be performed within the
space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement
upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum
or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith or some person thereunto lawfully authorized. " 1
The Statute was made for the purpose of preventing perjuries
and frauds, yet courts "sometime yield to the appeal made to their
sympathies by the exigencies of special circumstances, and in this
way there has developed from this 'bulwark of jurisprudence', a
parasite strangely coddled and nurtured by the judges who have
allowed themselves from time to time to be carried off by prejudice
of these special circumstances." 2 This so-called parasite is the doctrine of part performance and is found applicable in those cases
where one of the parties to a contract has partly performed his or
her part of the oral agreement, and by refusal of the other party
to carry out the agreement, who relies on the words of the Statute,
has been denied rights which he apparently thought was conferred
on him upon the supposition that the contract was to be carried
into execution, and has suffered unjust and unconscientious injuries. In cases of this sort, Courts of Equity will grant specific
execution of the oral agreement, notwithstanding the Statute, if
there be clear proof of a contract under which the party was acting,
and if the character of the performance be in that class recognized
by the court as sufficient.
Here occurs one of the anomalies of the law. The Statute of
Limitations by the term it uses in its outset that "no action shall
be brought" etc., has always been construed by the courts to have
I Stat. 29 Chap. III, § 4, Statutes at Large 405.
2 JESSE W. LImENTRAL,
HARV. L. REV. 455.
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no application to suits in equity. Yet the Statute of Frauds in
precisely the same words "no action shall be brought," has prevailed in suits of equity as well as actions at law. However by what
has been termed "judicial legislation," the doctrine of part performance has been contrived. This doctrine has in a way circumscribed the harsh effects that would result by a strict application
of the Statute of Frauds.
What is the true basis for the doctrine? One theory often found
explaining its existence is found in the statement that part performance is a valid substitute for the requisite writing required
by the Statute. This is clearly a violent assumption in the face
of the Statute, which leaves no room for any substitute.3 From
this theory is derived the general rule that equity will enforce a
parol agreement when there has been some unequivocal act referable, only, to the subject matter of controversy. The defendant
here is really charged upon the equities that result from the acts
done in the execution of the contract and not upon the contract
itself. In the language of Lord Chancellor Selborne, "The matter
has advanced beyond the stage of a contract and the equities which
arise out of the stage which it has reached cannot be administered
unless the contract is regarded ......
Itis not arbitrary or unreasonable to hold that when the Statute says that no action is to
be brought to charge any person upon a contract concerning land it
has in view the simple case in which the defendant is charged
only upon the contract and not in which there are equities resulting
from the res gestae subsequent to and arising out of the contract. "4
This may afford a reasonable explanation of the theory, but most
courts have been accustomed to give relief on the sound principal
of equity in preventing the perpetration of a fraud. Ordinarily
the refusal of the court to give specific performance of a contract
did not deprive the plaintiff of more than the benefit he anticipated
from the execution of the contract. But where one party in
reliance on an oral argreement has so far changed his position as
to suffer irreparable injury if the other party is permitted to
repudiate his agreement, equity will step in and take jurisdiction
on the ground of constructive fraud, that sort of fraud which is
cognizable in equity only.
Another theory advanced or, better, a theory doing away with
those already discussed is that all acts of part performance lie in
compensation.! Chancellor Kent says, "The tendency of modern
3 12 COL. L. RlEV. 282.
' Maddison V. Alderson, L. R. 8 Appeal cases, 487 (188a) °
B Foster v. Hale 3 Ves. 696 (1798) ; Anthony v. Leltwich, 3 Randolph 238. (Va.
1825).
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cases is to prefer giving part compensation in damages instead of
specific performance. Wherever damages will answer the purpose
of the indemnity, this alternative is to be preferred as it will equally
satisfy justice and will be in coincidence with the provisions and
in support of the Statute of Frauds."0
A few of our jurisdictions have carried this idea of Kent's
beyond its logical concInsion and reject the doctrine in its entirety.
In some of these states in order to prevent too great an injustice
a party who goes into possession and makes valuable improvements
on the faith of the oral agreement is allowed a lien for the value
7
of such improvements.
Courts of equity were originally given to grant relief where
the whole or part of the purchase money was paid. One of the
reasons for abandoning this view was found in the interpretation
of the Statute itself. It expressly provided that the payment in
whole or part of the purchase money shall exempt from its operation, a contract for the sale of wares, merchandise, etc. Thus part
payment was recognized under the seventeenth section of the
Statute as a substitute for the written memorandum. The fourth
section of the Statute was noticeably silent on this provision. The
presumption was then that the Statute would not regard part or
whole payment alone a sufficient substitute for the memorandum.8
A Delaware court, where the Statute of Frauds as it stood in that
state did not present any such difference between the fourth and
seventeenth section, has decreed the execution of a verbal contract
where part of the purchase money had been paid! There is a better
and less technical reason for the abandonment of the idea that payment is sufficient to take the case out of the Statute: a party can
always recover the amount paid under the oral agreement. Another
reason given is that the fourth section of the Statute was originally interpreted as not applying to contracts partly executed.
Therefore equity would, on the ground of part performance where
the purchase money had been paid, decree specific execution of
the contract. This interpretation of the Statute soon became
obsolete and with it the insufficiency of the payment of the purchase price was discarded as an act of part performance.
Likewise, marriage has never been considered as a sufficient act
of performance to take a case out of the Statute, contrary to the
6 Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 1 Johns Ch. Rep. 273 (N. Y. 1806).
7 Bulltt v. Eastern Land Co. 99 Ky. 324, 36 S. W. 16 (1896) ; Ridloy v. McNairy,
2 Humph. 174 (Tenn. 1840).
S ClInan v. Cooke, 1 Sob. & L. 22 (1802).
o Houston v. Townsend, 1 Del Ch. 416 (1833).
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rules which prevail in other cases of contract. 0 "In this respect,"
says Justice Story, "it is always treated as a peculiar case standing
on its own grounds." The reason found for this is the notion that
between the parties to the wedlock, the performance of the
marriage is not such part performance as is generally looked upon
as sufficient. The fallacy of this view becomes apparent when one
considers the true basis of granting specific performance, where
some acts have been done in reliance on the promise, as grounded
on fraud. In a case where the defendant made an ante-nuptial
agreement with his intended wife, that in consideration of their
marriage and of his having charge of their infant son, the plaintiff, during his minority, he, the defendant, would devise to his
son and any children born of this union all his property in equal
shares, the marriage was held to be sufficient part performance to
render the contract enforceable. 2 The court could have found
other reasons on which to base their decision, namely the custody of
the son. Yet it decided the question squarely on marriage alone.
It repudiates in no uncertain terms the prevalent view on the
insufficiency of marriage as an act of part performance. Marriage
is a valuable consideration, to the court's sane notion, and its celebration in conformity to the oral promise puts the female contracting party in such a position that she cannot restore herself to her
former status. This would work such a "heinous fraud upon her,
as a court of conscience could not tolerate but, acting on principle
rather than precedent, should decree the enforcement notwithstanding the Statute." The decision of the case has met with approval.' 3
The lack of mutuality in such contracts, as the courts cannot compel a marriage, is found as the influential factor in determining
the majority opinion that marriage is insufficient.
Taking possession of the land, alone, has generally been considered a sufficient act of part performance in England and most of
the American jurisdiction. 4 West Virginia has been credited with
following this view. This was justified, sometimes on fraud in that
the vendee would otherwise be liable as a trespasser. It was overlooked that the contract being merely unenforceable, not void,
could be used as a defense to such an action. It is said, usually,
that the taking of possession is an act of part performance and the
only act unequivocally referrable to the contract. The objection
then arises that this act does not necessarily show the existence
10 1\Montacute v. Maxvell, 1I Pere Williams 618 (1709).
1 2 STORY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed-) § 768.
Nowack v. Berger. 133 Io. 24, 34 S. W. 489 (1896).

12
13

10 HARV. L. Rnv. 60; BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS

(14th

ed.) §

459.

u Mller v. Finley 5 L. T. Rep. 510; Keatts v. Rector, 1 Ark 391 (1837) ; McCarger
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of some contract in reference to the land. The entry may have
been made under a parol license. Again no fraud is worked on the
party taking possession. No irreparable harm or valuable improvements need be made where possession alone is sufficient.
Going into possession operates not only in favor of the purchaser
or lessee but also in favor of the vendor or lessor by application of
the positive rule of mutuality. The possession must be taken with
the consent of the vendor, or lessor; must be exclusive and
notorious; mere continuance in possession is not enough although
coupled with the payment of increased rental it is recognized as
sufficient. 5
A few jurisdictions have considered mere possession insufficient.
They have coupled.with it the payment of the whole or a substantial part of the purchase money.18 It seems, as if in adopting the
mere possession theory, they have realized its defects and seek to
combine with it another element, the payment of money, which
has been even more defective. It is difficult to see, if each element
is so defective, how both together can be enough to take the case
out of the Statute.
Some states have taken the view that valuable improvements
made on the land coupled with possession are sufficient acts of
part performance to take the case out of the operation of the
Statute. 7 The improvements are considered acts unequivocally
referring to and resulting from an agreement such as parties would
not have done unless on account of that very agreement and with
a direct view of its performance. The agreement set up must
appear to be the same with the one partly performed. There must
be no equivocation or uncertainty in the case. The improvements
relied on must be of permanent, beneficial interest to the land.
But equity will not inquire whether they have been judiciously
made. To use the language of Lord Thurlow, "Whether the
money has been ill or well laid out is indifferent, the fraud is the
same."' 8 It must appear that the losses of improvement would
be a sacrifice to the purchaser. If, therefore he has gained more by
the occasion and use of the land than he has lost by his improvements, they will not be available to him as a ground for specific
v. Rood, 47 Cal. 138 (1873); Van Epps v. Redfield, 69 Conn. 104. (1893) : Felton

v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485 (1882) ; Kelley v. Stansberry, 13 Ohio 408 (1844) ; Wood V.
Stevenson, 43 W. Va. 149, 27 S. E. 309 (1897); Townsend v. Vanderworker, 160
U. S. 170 (1895).
'5 Wills v. Stradling, 3 ves. 378 (1797) ; Mundy v. Joliffe, 5 Mylno & Craig 167
(1834) ; Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co. 96 Ala. 515, 11 South. 695 (1892).
16 Frame v. Dawson, 14 yes. 386 (1807) ; Bowman v. Walford, 80 Va. 213 (1885).
'7 Whitehead v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C. C. 417 (1784).
1 Wack v. Sober, 2 Whart. 387 (Pa. 1837).
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performance."3 The acts should be such that adequate compensation cannot be made except by conveyance of the land. This is
true on the theory that fraud is the basis for giving the remedy.
There would be no fraud if adequate compensation could be
obtained . Possession coupled with improvements does not necessarily preclude the possibility of one recovering for the improvements made and the reason for granting relief fails.
Perhaps the best and most logical rule is that one adopted by the
Massachusetts courts. The rule in that jurisdiction requires acts
which result in an irrevocable change of position or irreparable
harm before specific execution will be given. West Virginia, in
a comparatively recent decision, has followed along the lines expressed by the Massachusetts courts. The West Virginia case
held that the acts done must be of such a nature as to work "an
altered situation on the part of the vendee not compensative in
money, and make non-completion of the contract on part of the
vendor inequitable and fraudulent.' ' This is a step in the right
direction, although a clear departure from rules laid down in
earlier decisions of the state. These earlier cases hold that possession in an oral contract for the sale of land is sufficient to take
the case out of the Statute.2' However it appears that the West
Virginia courts have not tied themselves fast to the Massachusetts
rule. A later case that involved the sale of growing timber (realty)
held that "if the possession is defective the building of valuable
improvements may be held to take the case out of the Statute." This
intimates that possession alone if exclusive, etc., would still be regarded as a sufficient act.2 The latest decision on the question in
West Virginia involves the specific execution of a lease. This case
strikes the same note as that sounded in Smith v. Peterson, that
the agreement "must have been so far executed that a refusal of
relief would operate as a fraud upon the party and place him in a
situation which does not lie in compensation. ' 2 3 It is to be hoped
that the West Virginia courts will take cognizance of the value
of the opinions in these cases in making their decision on this subject in the future.
Part performance has always been recognized in applying to
oral promises for the gift of land where the party relying on the
10 Low v,. Low, 173 Mass. 580 (1899) ;Pennsylvania courts have stated the doctrine
of part performance approaching the view of the Massachusetts theory. Hart -v.
Carroll, 85 Pa. 508, 510, (1877) ; Dugan v. Colville, 8 Tex. 126 (1852).
0 Smith v. Peterson, 71 W. Va. 364, 76 S. E. 804 (1911).
2L Campbell v. Fetterman, 20 W. Va. 398; Miller v. Lorentz, 39 W. Va. 160,
19 S. E. 391 (1894) ; Lipscomb . Lipscomb, 66 W. Va. 55, 66 S. E. 5 (1908).
2 Gibson v. Stalnaker 87 W. Va. 710, 106 S. E. 243 (1921).
1 Wegman -. Clark, 94 W. Va. 364, 118 S. E. 517 (1923).
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promise takes possession and erects valuable improvements thereon.' Possession alone, by the donee has never been considered a
sufficient act to take the case out of the Statute. The donee must
have made valuable improvements to obtain relief in these sort of
cases. To refuse relief where irreparable acts have been performed
would work fraud on the donee. The care and high quality of proof
which must be exercised in cases of pure gifts is well illustrated by
the experiences of Virginia, where the specific execution of parol
gifts of land became such a "prolific source of fraud" that a
statute was enacted prohibiting the enforcement of such gifts even
when followed by possession and improvements of the land by the
donee claiming it. 5 West Virginia follows the general rule. Yet
it is careful to observe that valuable permanent improvements are
made so that a rescission of the gift would result in hardship upon
the donee.2"
There is a strong majority view that refuses to recognize personal
services alone as a sufficient act of part performance.27 As a result
great hardship has been worked on those who have tendered services for a great length of time on the strength of an oral promise
to have land conveyed to them. The reason for this view is based
on the grounds that personal service alone is an unequivocal act not
pecessarily referring to a contract for the conveyance of land; the
connection of the res gestae with the alleged contract cannot be
established by the res gestae themselves but depends on parol
testimony. A minority view gives relief where personal services
entails a change in life of the party rendering services. Here, the
services are of such a peculiar character that it would be impossible
to estimate their value "by any pecuniary standard even though
possession of the land to be conveyed has never been in the
vendee."' 28 West Virginia follows this view where the nature of
the services rendered is within the character just described. 29
Whether the doctrine of part performance has application to
any contract besides land has been seemingly settled in the negative.30 The doctrine has received severe condemnation even in
Freeman v. Wakeman, 43 N. Y. 34 (1870).
F
COD Or VA. 1887, §2413; whoiford v. Wholford, 121 Va. 699, 93 S. E. 629
(1917) ; Brooks v. Clintsman, 124 Va. 736, 98 S. D. 742 (1919).
0 Harrison v. Harrison 36 W. Va. 320, 15 S. E. 417 (1892) Stone v. Hill, 52
W. Va. 63, 43 S. E. 92 (1902) ; Holsberry v. Harris, 56 W. Va. 320, 49 S. B. 404
(1904) ; Moss V. 'Moss, 88 W. Va. 135, 106 S. E. 429 (1921).
- Maddison v2. Alderson, supra; Edwards v. Estell, 48 Cal. 194 (1874) ; Miller v.
Joiner, 20 Fla. 479 (1884) ; Crabill v. Marsh, 38 Ohio St. 331 (1882) ; Wright v.
Puckett, 22 Gratt. 370 (Va. 1872).
Watson v. Mahan 20 Ind. 220 (1863); Vreeland v. Vreeland, 53 N. J. Eq.
387, (1895) ; Britton v. Cott, 8 Utah 480.
9 Bryson 12. McShane 48 W. Va. 127, 35 S. E. 348 (1901) ; Atkins v. Sayre,
121 S. E. 283 (1924).
w HammerIy v,. DeBiel, 12 Cl. & Fin. 45 (1845) ; BROWN, STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
Chap. 19, §460.
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regard to contracts for the sale of land. It has once been expressed
'31
as a contrivance "to improve gentlemen out of their estates.
Had the Statute been rigorously enforced the result would have
been different. "Few instances of parol agreements would have
occurred, whereas it is manifest that the decisions on the subject
have opened a new door to fraud." It is useless, however, to
bewail the laxity that has prevailed in the enforcement of the
Statute which has allowed the doctrine of part performance to
spring up that has so firmly become rooted in the courts of equity.
Our best way out is to require more rigid acts of part performance-acts that approach the irreparable.
-A. P.

HuSBAND Aim WIFE, Doicmn op WFm.--The question of when
and under what circumstances a wife may acquire a domicile
different from that of her husband is becoming more important
in the courts of this country. With the so-called "rise of women's
rights," noted in the enabling statutes passed in practically all
jurisdictions, and in the present tendency towards more equality of
treatment by the law, it seems that the conditions under which a
wife can acquire a different domicile may be worth consideration.
It is the general principle of the common law that a married
woman merges her legal entity in that of the husband, and upon
marriage she acquires his domicile,1 which changes with every
alteration of his, regardless of the actual locality of her residence.'
The common law theory was that the very being or legal existence
of the wife was suspended during marriage,3 that a person under
authority of another has no right to choose a domicile.4 This is the
rule in England at the present time. The fact that a wife actually
lives apart from her husband, that they have separated by agreement,' that the husband may have been guilty of such misconduct
as would furnish a defense to a suit by him for restoration of
conjugal rights,7 does not enable a wife to acquire a separate domim Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & L. 5 (1804).
1

MNo , CONPL. LAws, 46.

Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 706 (1883) ; Watkins v. Watkins, 135 Mass. 83,
858 (1883).
s
1

BL.
Co. 442.
STORY, CON-L. LAwS, 48.
Warrender, 2 CI. and F. 488 (1835).
' Warrender vP.
6 Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390 (1859) ; In re. MAackenzie, (1911) 1 Cha. 578.
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 1 Sw. and Tr. 574 (1859) ; Dolphin v. Robins; Note 6,
supra.
'
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